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et al.: Equal Protection

EQUAL PROTECTION
N.Y. Const. art. , § 11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof.
U.S. Const. amend XV, § 1:
No State shall ...

deny to any person within its jurisdictionthe

equal protection of the laws.

COURT OF APPEALS
75 4

People v. Childress
(decided February 23, 1993)

A criminal defendant claimed his equal protection rights755
were violated by the prosecution's use of race-based peremptory
challenges. 7 5 6 The New York Court of Appeals held that the

754. 81 N.Y.2d 263, 614 N.E.2d 709, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1993).
755. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
756. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 265, 614 N.E.2d at 710, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
147. Although not expressly claimed by the defendant or stated by the court,
the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution has also been
held to have been violated upon a showing of a discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges during jury selection. See People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d
317, 320, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1992) ("[Tihe
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.., violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the State Constitution.. .. "); People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 649,
554 N.E.2d 1235, 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 652 (1990) (holding that while the
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution restricts the use of
peremptory challenges so as to purposefully exclude persons of a particular
race from a jury, to the extent that the state equal protection clause "is
coextensive with the Federal provision," the state constitutional provision
prohibits such discrimination as well). The New York State Equal Protection
Clause provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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defendant's equal protection rights were not violated because the
defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of unlawful
discrimination with regard to the prosecution's exercise of its
peremptory challenges.757
During jury selection preceding the burglary trial of an
African-American defendant, defense counsel raised an objection
to the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges, 75 8 claiming
that they were purposefully being exercised in order to exclude
African-Americans from the jury. 759 The prosecution stated, on
the record, that despite the fact that peremptory challenges had
been exercised against two out of the three prospective African760
American jurors, neither challenge was motivated by race.
The trial judge, although taking note of defense counsel's
exception, refused to exclude the peremptory challenges. 76 1 The
defendant was subsequently convicted. 762 The appellate division,
in affirming the conviction, held that the defendant "failed to
substantiate his claim... since the voir dire proceedings ha[d]
763
not been made available as part of the record on appeal."
At issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether
the defendant satisfied the minimum showing required to
establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges, 7 64 as articulated in Batson v.
757. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 268, 614 N.E.2d at 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
149.
758. The permissible number of peremptory challenges, or challenges made

without reason or cause, is governed in state criminal proceedings by N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994).
759. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 265, 614 N.E.2d at 710, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
147.
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. Id.
763. People v. Childress, 177 A.D.2d 498, 499, 575 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019
(2d Dep't 1991) In addition to the equal protection claim, the court held that
the state satisfied its burden of proving that the defendant was competent to
stand trial. Id. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in its denial of defense
request for a jury charge on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in
the second degree. Id.
764. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 264, 614 N.E.2d at 710, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
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Kentucky. 765 In Batson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that an individual is denied his equal protection rights
when the state places that person on trial with a jury from which
766
members of his or her race have been purposefully excluded.
However, the Supreme Court noted that the Equal Protection
Clause does not give a defendant a right to have a jury, which is
767
composed in whole or in part, of persons of his own race.
The Batson Court articulated the standard for assessing a prima
facie case of racially motivated discrimination in the selection of
a petit jury. 7 68 The defendant must first demonstrate that he is a
"member of a cognizable racial group" and that the prosecution
used its peremptory challenges to remove one or more members
of that racial group from the venire. 769 The defendant must then
raise an inference, using these facts and other relevant
circumstances, that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges
to exclude prospective jurors based on the fact that they are
770
members of the defendant's racial group.
The Batson Court stated that in determining whether the
defendant has made a prima facie showing, the trial judge can
consider such things as "a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors
included in the particular venire" or even "the prosecutor's
765. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
766. Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). The
Batson court stated that Strauder "laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing
efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the
venire from which individual jurors are drawn." Id.
767. Id. at 85 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305).
768. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
769. Id. at 96.
770. Id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation
of this particular equal protection guarantee in ruling that a Batson challenge is
not limited to situations where the defendant and the challenged venire member
are of the same racial group. See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
In Powers, the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a
prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise
qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of their
race." Id. at 409. In acknowledging Batson, the Court found that a white
defendant may rightfully challenge the prosecution's peremptory challenges of
African-American jurors. Id. at 404. Citing Batson, the Court said that "[a]
person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.'" Id. at 410.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 29

950

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

questions and statements during voir dire examination."

77 1

Upon

a successful showing by the defendant, the burden shifts to the

prosecutor to present race-neutral explanations for challenging

772
the prospective jurors in that particular racial group.
In Childress,773 the New York Court of Appeals applied the
Batson formulation. Finding that the defendant satisfactorily
demonstrated that members of a particular cognizable racial
group, African-Americans, had been excluded by the

prosecution's peremptory challenges, the court dispatched this
first element of the prima facie showing and focused on the more
problematic second element.774 With respect to this element, the
court explained that "[t]here are no fixed rules for determining
what evidence will give rise to an inference sufficient to establish
a prima facie case." 775 The defendant in Childress, in an attempt
to provide support for the inference, relied on the mere fact that
the prosecutor admittedly used his challenges to exclude two of
the three African-American jurors. 776 Additionally, the defendant
771. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
772. Id. However, realizing that this shifted burden places a limitation on
the "peremptory character of the historic challenge[,]" the Court emphasized
that "the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise
of a challenge for cause." Id.
773. 81 N.Y.2d at 266, 614 N.E.2d at 711, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
774. Id.
775. Id. (citation omitted). The court elaborated on this proposition:
A pattern of strikes or questions and statements made during the voir
dire may be sufficient in a particular case ....

Additionally, this

element may be established by a showing that members of the
cognizable group were excluded while others with the same relevant
characteristics were not .

. .

. Another legally significant circumstance

may exist where the prosecution has stricken members of this group
who, because of their background and experience, might otherwise be
expected to be favorably disposed to the prosecution ....

The court

should also take into consideration the fact that the mere existence of a
system of peremptory challenges may serve as a vehicle for
motivated
with
racially
by
those
discrimination
inclinations ....

Conversely, "[tihe mere inclusion of some members

of defendant's ethnic group will not defeat an otherwise meritorious
[Batson] motion .... "
Id. at 266-67, 614 N.E.2d at 711, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 148 (citations omitted).
776. Id. at 267-68, 614 N.E.2d at 711-12, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
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relied on the fact that the questioning of the prospective jurors
was proper, therefore, indicating no rationale as to why they
could not serve fairly on the jury. 777 While the court found that
the former argument was insufficient to establish a "pattern of
purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of
discrimination,"778 the latter contention, as the court stated,

"served only to highlight that the stricken jurors demonstrated no
biases that would disqualify them for service or support a
challenge for cause. " 77 9 Under the circumstances of the record

before it, the court held that the defendant failed to establish a
sound factual basis sufficient to raise the inference that the
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges

to exclude

prospective jurors based on race. 780 Additionally, the court held
777. Id.
778. Id. at 267, 614 N.E.2d at 711, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 148. See People v.
Steele, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 956
(1992) (finding that the prosecution's exercise of "three of her four challenges
against African-Americans... alone is not sufficient to establish a pattern of
exclusion of African-Americans").
779. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 268, 614 N.E.2d at 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
149.
780. Id.; but see People v. Boiling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325, 591 N.E.2d 1136,
1141, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 955 (1992) (finding that the disproportionate number
of peremptory challenges to African-American prospective jurors in
conjunction with uncontroverted evidence that two of the challenged jurors had
pro prosecution backgrounds, provided a sufficient basis for raising the
inference that the prosecution was using its peremptory challenges for
discriminatory purposes); People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 556, 554 N.E.2d
47, 50, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (1990) (holding that a disproportionate number of
peremptory strikes against African-American prospective jurors who were
described as "'a heterogeneous group of both sexes with different occupations
and social backgrounds' ... and [who] did not otherwise appear to be unsuited
for jury service on this case," provided support for shifting the burden of
coming forth with race-neutral explanations for the suspect peremptory
challenges to the prosecution); People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 516
N.E.2d1208, 1211, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97 (1987) (holding that the defendant
established a prima facie claim that the prosecution exercised its peremptory
challenges in order to exclude African-Americans, described as "a
heterogeneous group which included different sexes, different occupations and
different social backgrounds," based on the fact that "[n]one of the
[prospective] jurors exhibited signs of bias favoring defendant[, t]o the
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that it is not necessary to furnish the minutes of the voir dire in
78 1
order to obtain relief on appeal under Batson.

In conclusion, by failing to meet the second prong of the
Batson test, the defendant did not establish a prima facie showing
of racial discrimination in the prosecution's use of peremptory

challenges. Therefore, defendant's equal protection rights under
both the New York State and Federal Constitutions had not been
violated.
782

People v. Walker
(decided October 12, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to equal protection pursuant to
the State7 83 and Federal7 84 Constitutions was violated because
contrary, their backgrounds and knowledge of the case suggested that any bias
they might have would favor the prosecution").
781. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 268, 614 N.E.2d at 712, 598 N.Y.S.2d at
149. As the court explained:
[I]n order to give the trial court a proper foundation to evaluate the
claim - as well as to ensure an adequate record for appellate review a party asserting a claim under Batson v. Kentucky... should articulate
and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and
legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and
discussed .... Despite the absence of voir dire minutes, a trial or
appellate court may determine, based on facts elicited during the Batson
colloquy, whether a prima facie case of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges has been established ....
Id. (citations omitted).
782. 81 N.Y.2d 661, 623 N.E.2d 1, 603 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1993).
783. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
784. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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